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Abstract: Corporate governance sits at the intersection of many disciplines from law, 
business, management, finance, and accounting.  The point of departure for the overwhelming 
proportion of studies concerns the ugliness of greed, ambition, misdemeanors and malfeasance 
of corporations, their directors, and those actors hold own shares in them. This essay takes a 
rather different starting point. Drawing upon insights from a radically different field, it uses 
the discussion of aesthetics in Dewey’s treatise on art to ask what motivates directors to act in 
ways that constitute the attention and engagement that we associate with the effectiveness of 
boards. Using Dewey’s thinking about aesthetic experience, this paper compares it with 
accounts of the experience of corporate boards, both in the literature and in the personal 
experience of the author. These observations point to need to reflect on motivation when 
considering both the practice of corporate governance and the policy frameworks in which it 
operates. 
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Entering the boardroom 
The oak-paneled walls of the stately boardroom of one company where I worked were 
covered with large canvases painted by a variety of modernist artists: impressionists, post-
impressionists, and expressionists. The plain, plasterboard walls of boardroom of a charity I 
serve are lined with more modest yet no less evocative works: paintings, mainly on paper, by 
some of the people we help with their learning difficulties, mental health issues and dementia.  
The first, to be sure, was an ostentatious display for the few allowed to enter this special 
place. The second shows a need to brighten up the grim physical space, which doubles on 
other days as a meeting room in frequent use by staff from several departments. Yet these 
gestures also suggest that organizations of different types choose to remind directors of the 
larger things in life, outside the immediate issues needing decisions, and that the directors 
themselves like to be reminded of them.  
 
* Donald Nordberg is Associate Professor at Bournemouth University Business School in the UK. His research 
has appeared in a wide range of journals including Corporate Governance: An International Review, Business 
History, European Management Journal, Philosophy of Management, and Corporate Governance: The 
International Journal of Business in Society. His second book, The Cadbury Code and the Recurrent Crisis: A 
Model for Corporate Governance?, will be published shortly by Palgrave Macmillan. 
 2  
How might board deliberations present something other than the problem of self-centered, 
self-important agency we hear so much of in the literature of corporate governance? Can the 
forms of corporate governance conducted in these rooms be, well, beautiful? 
Corporate governance can be ugly. At the top of corporations, greed seems prevalent and 
stewardship lacking, hostilities erupt around contested takeovers, vulture capitalism, and 
activist hedge funds instigating disruption. Other types of organizations, too, are replete with 
inter-personal rivalry, pay excesses and self-serving managers, and a sense of a need to win at 
the expense of other organizations that would eat our lunch.  
Such phenomena have generated considerable academic study – drawn from accountancy, 
financial economics, sociology, and (the lack of) business ethics. Much of it seeks to diagnose 
the causes from the symptoms of such corporate malaise and inform regulation and codes of 
conduct in the hope of curing the problem.  
But such analysis misses an important part of the experience of corporate governance, the 
pleasure in and the sensation of creating value, that directors and senior managers often seem 
to derive from the processes of board decision-making. Quiet accounts of directors are 
brightened by expressions of a job well done, even if the job done leaves no trace visible to 
the outside world. The work directors seem most proud of is fending off disasters, thwarting 
attacks, and preventing the departures of key personnel. Such achievements rarely hit the 
headlines or form the basis of an entry on a director’s curriculum vitae. They defy observation, 
let alone measurement of the efficiency in process or success in terms of outcomes.  
Moreover, while executive pay remains a large issue, the directors we call “outside” in 
America or “non-executive” in Britain give their advice for levels of pay dwarfed by those 
afforded to management consultants. In charities, they go largely without pay. And, unlike 
shareholders, who can lose only as much (or little) as they invest, the directors who serve them 
face unlimited, personal liability when the decisions go wrong. Against such a background, 
this paper asks: Why (in the world!) would someone want to be a company director? It seeks 
an answer by drawing upon theory developed at great distance from the disciplines that usually 
inform writings on boards of directors.  
First, let’s consider the argument of the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey that art can 
best be understood when viewed not as an object, but instead as an experience – of both the 
artist and the audience – and that experience invests meaning in activity. His theorizing took 
place in the intellectual context of the disruptions in trade, society and politics of the 1930s 
and the Great Depression, ugly events that also spawned public concern for corporate 
governance. Then we look at how that theorizing lets us reflect on the works of boards. The 
paper concludes with observations about how those insights about what does right in 
boardrooms can help us better understand where they go wrong, and what directors, 
policymakers and the public at large can expect to achieve. 
Art, experience, and the Great Depression 
In his 1930s lectures at Harvard University in memory of William James, the American 
philosopher and polymath John Dewey laid out a theory of aesthetics, subsequently published 
as Art as  Experience (1934/1958). The date of delivery and publication is pertinent. This was 
a few years after the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the first global corporate governance crisis, 
when thinkers from a wide range of fields were trying to understand what had gone wrong.  
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The Crash and its aftermaths 
Academic study of corporate governance frequently starts with a nod to Berle and Means 
(1932/1991), who traced the roots of the crash to the a loss of control in what they called the 
“modern corporation.” The crash set of the deepest economic depression in modern history, 
which infected the economies of many countries around the world and led to realignment of 
political power in many countries and almost certainly fueled the tensions that led to the 
Second World War. Berle and Means thought corporate excess in the 1920s was fueled by the 
empowerment of hired managers at the expense of increasingly distant shareholders, and the 
dispersion of ownership to people with little control over the managers they employ. 
Economic theory divorced people even further from the corporation. Coase (1937) 
suggested that the purpose of companies was to internalize transactions that markets could not 
efficiently conduct. This rarified view, based in law and economics, situates some people – 
employees – as instruments of value creation, rather than as recipients, while corporate 
ownership receded to an abstraction.  
A different view of corporate purpose arose in that time as well: that private enterprises, 
rather than the state, bring value to society through innovation and entrepreneurship. It is 
rooted in the thinking of Schumpeter, who located social good in corporate enterprise and not 
just social irresponsibility (published later as Schumpeter, 1942/1976). Here, the creators are 
the entrepreneurs, who are not necessarily the owners. These seminal works outlined the 
problems in capitalism and sought solutions that could defend it against a socialist or 
communist alternative.  
Grounded in these ways, the so-called theory of the firm explained how – despite the Crash 
– corporate entities bring about economic growth and ultimately societal value. And far from 
being dismantled as a hazard to society, corporations flourished, became more central, more 
important in western economies, and more dominant in the lives of people.  
But with power came opportunities for abuse, which became all too apparent when the 
heady “go-go years” of the 1950s and 1960s (Brooks, 1973) gave way to stagflation in 
subsequent decades, exposing weaknesses in corporate governance, new excesses, and new 
crises (MacAvoy & Millstein, 2003), some of which had global implications (Nordberg, 
2012). Scholars have sought identify ways to prevent corporate malfeasance, identifying 
inputs, like board design or director independence, that might influence outputs, including 
different measures of firm performance (e.g. Payne, Benson, & Finegold, 2009). Policymakers 
sought to use those findings to design structures and mechanisms in the pursuit of best practice, 
which became important in legal and regulatory moves to constrain corporate managements 
and boards, or codes of conduct to guide them toward safer outcomes.  
While such analysis yielded ambiguous results, (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Dalton 
& Aguinis, 2013), practitioners – directors and the consultants who serve them – often found 
something helpful in these governance models. Their deliberations contemplate the benefits 
of structures, their elegance as much as their utility. Is “good” governance more than a calculus 
of inputs and outputs? Do we value the possibility that boardroom power is not merely 
controlled but also balanced? What do practitioners themselves value about working on 
boards? Let’s take a short stroll into an unusual area to consider the question of what we value. 
 4  
Art, meaning-making, and experience 
On the surface, the subject of Dewey’s essay could scarcely be more remote from the 
corporation and its economics. He writes on painting, sculpture, architecture, the novel, and 
poetry, and how both the artist and the audience draw meaning from the experience of the 
artistic creation.  
His depiction of the aesthetic has little to do with narrow conceptions of “high art.” Indeed, 
he writes that to understand the aesthetic, “one must begin with it in the raw … the sights that 
hold the crowd – the fire engine rushing by; the machines excavating enormous holes in the 
earth” (Dewey, 1934/1958, pp. 4-5). These are examples of the sensation of the observer. 
Shortly later he writes, “The intelligent mechanic engaged in his job, interested in doing well 
and finding satisfaction in his handiwork, caring for his materials and tools with genuine 
affections, is artistically engaged” (p. 5), this a depiction of the creator’s response. In 
contemporary as well as ancient societies, practices including body scarification, ornamental 
dress and jewelry indicate that “everything that intensifies the sense of immediate living in an 
object of intense admiration” (p. 6).  
He rejects theories of art that spiritualize it “out of connection with the objects of concrete 
experience” (p. 11). Art is “the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restoring 
consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action” 
(p. 25). With these observations, Dewey brings us a range of objects but not quite to the 
definition of art as experience. We have “an experience when the material experienced runs 
its course to fulfillment” (p. 35, emphasis in the orginal). 
This assertion is a definition event his supporters say is incomplete and perhaps 
paradoxical. In a book largely honoring Dewey, Shusterman (2000, p. 35) calls his “clearly an 
inadequate and inaccurate definition”. In Dewey’s defense, Shusterman asserts that this 
approach was, at least, not part of the “long history of failed attempts at essentialist definitions 
of art” (2000, p. 37). Dewey did not attempt to articulate the essence of art, which would have 
defied the nonfoundationalist core of his pragmatist philosophy.  Instead, he calls attention to 
the pragmatists’ view of the centrality of practice. For Dewey, artistic sensation arises not in 
the object, the creation, but rather in the experience of creating and then observing it. The 
heightened sensitivity, the intensification of the immediate, achieved in the experience of 
making or apprehending the aesthetic object is what signifies the artistic.  
On this view, art-as-experience implies something historically situated, enduring but 
impermanent, reflective of and dependent on context, with meaning created from the 
interaction of the creator and then audience with the thing created. This is not an aesthetics of 
ideal types, of striving for perfection. The experience of the artist will differ from that of the 
audience. Yet both will deem their experience as art when they encounter enhanced sensitivity 
and sensibility, that is, when the experience brings new sensations, cognitions and emotions. 
Moreover, apprehension – by creator and observer – of routine, imitative, mass-produced 
objects may not achieve such feelings, producing instead something that might be termed, as 
Smuts (2005) argues,  an “anesthetic experience.” 
The ethics of the aesthetic in Dewey 
For Dewey, aesthetic experience has a moral dimension, a proposition he argues through 
the negative. “One great defect in what passes for morality is its anesthetic quality. Instead of 
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exemplifying wholehearted action, it takes the form of grudging piecemeal concessions to the 
demands of duty” (1934/1958, p. 39). When the artist or the audience focuses on duty to some 
external standard their sensitivity can be blunted. Turning the argument around, moral action, 
he argues that, for the Greeks, involves conduct that is elegant, in proportion, and graceful. 
Practical activity, he writes, has an aesthetic quality when it is “integrated and moves by its 
own urge to fulfillment.”  
Dewey links this fulfillment to the artist’s “unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things” 
(1934/1958, p. 49), as artists shape and reshape their objects until they are satisfied with what 
they perceive in them. The audiences of art – the beholders, in Dewey’s argument – perceive 
the object by creating their own experiences of it, perceptions comparable to but necessarily 
not identical with those of the artist (p. 54). 
This experiential view of art, related to but separate from the object, can apply to 
performance arts: to drama, which is enacted and then is no more; to improvisational jazz, 
which lacks even a script; and to art installations, in which the thing experienced is in part the 
experiences of other members of the audience. Let us draw an analogy, then, and consider how 
we can think of non-things – management and leadership, for example – as beautiful or ugly, 
as well as mundane or dull. And if art lies not so much in the tangible object but in the 
experience, the term might justifiably be used to signify the experience of the intangible as 
well. 
The art in organization, leadership 
The role of aesthetics in product development and marketing may be obvious, but such 
discussion might seem far removed from the work of top management teams, boards of 
directors and institutional investors. There has, however, been an undercurrent of interest in 
aesthetics in various corners of the management literature. Strati (2008) traces its origins to 
the 1990s and special issues of the journals Human Relations and Organization. His book 
(Strati, 1999) highlights similarities between aesthetic understanding and tacit knowledge, and 
asks us to think of the artifacts of organizations as including intangible elements. They draw 
on processes in which “one must place oneself in the imaginary – rather than factive and 
physical” (Strati, 1999, p. 13). That these processes are also “evocative” resonates with the 
importance of experience in Dewey’s aesthetics. 
More recently, Nancy Adler has made something of a campaign to alert us to an imperative 
for beauty in leadership (Adler, 2006, 2011; Adler & Delbecq, 2018). Latham (2014, pp. 125, 
127) urges an art-centric approach to leadership research, noting that the field draws upon the 
“stories of lived experiences”, which can “teach, mobilize, and motivate”. Shotter and Tsoukas 
(2014, p. 224) write of the “art of judgment” in leadership, describing it as an exercise of 
phronesis – the Aristotelian virtue of practice – to grasp the salient features of ambiguous 
situations that constitute a “landscape” of possible paths. Their emphasis of practice in this art 
and on the centrality of emotion to judgment, rather than just rationality, has echoes of 
Dewey’s aesthetics.  
Ladkin (2008) recounts the experience of a jazz concert as an example of how someone 
leads beautifully. Recent critiques of leadership theory (Bryant & Wolfram Cox, 2014; Costas 
& Taheri, 2012), including the shallowness of some accounts of “authentic leadership,” point 
to a need to consider approaches that work towards heightened sensitivity of complex 
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interactions with followers. Moreover, the “practice turn” in management research has tended 
to focus on intraorganizational activities or interorganizational outcomes, or a combination of 
the two (Whittington, 2006).  
The emphasis of these authors on the art of management, by contrast, draw attention to 
how practice carries cognitive and affective meaning. Dewey’s aesthetics alerts us to pay 
attention to the meaning that derives from the experience of managing, leading and directing 
organizations.  
Art in corporate governance 
How, then, might we understand the role of art-as-experience in the work of corporate 
directors? Dewey’s treatise (1934/1958) does not offer a handy template to assess its 
application to other fields; indeed, imagining that it could might be considered antithetical to 
his argument. Instead, let us consider here, tentatively, the elements of the work of boards of 
directors, how they might constitute the “act of expression” (Chapter IV), the iterative 
construction and reconstruction involved in creating a “union of sense, need, impulse and 
action” (p. 25) and of practitioners “finding satisfaction” in their “handiwork” (p. 5), 
expressions Dewey uses to describe the experience of creation. Then let us consider, even 
more tentatively, how observers of board meetings – the middle-ranking executives invited to 
present to the board, or new directors finding their way into discussions of longstanding, 
gnarled problems – finding meaning through the experience. 
To do so, I draw in part upon some of the less fully articulated aspects of qualitative studies 
of boards in operation, but also upon personal reflections of the boards on which I have served. 
Two were small, private firms in publishing, which sought capital for expansion and then 
proved unable to use it to good effect. Two others were large charities, with income in the 
millions and tens of millions of pounds sterling, each with active and engaged boards.  
Board meetings of one of the publishing companies were infrequent, acrimonious, and 
unproductive. The company limped on for several years before collapsing. The other had 
frequent and full meetings, leading to collective decisions the participants found satisfying. 
But the company’s financial circumstances were far more fragile than we thought, which led 
to its ultimate failure. The charities both dealt with difficult finances – not-for-profit 
organizations rarely achieve the financial buffer to guarantee viability – but board meetings 
were productive, insightful, and enlightening, for managers and directors alike. 
The act of expression 
For Dewey, expression involves more than an explosion of emotion. For example, he 
draws a contrast between self-expression and self-exposure; the latter involves disclosing 
character to others in a way that is “only a spewing forth” (1934/1958, p. 62). Dewey 
(1934/1958, p. 58) describes the act of expression as arising from an “impulsion.” He draws a 
distinction to an impulse, which is “specialized and particular.” Impulsion is a movement 
outward and forward of the whole organism, like a craving for food. Impulsion alone is not 
sufficient for expression, however. When impulsion meets resistance, the person is forced into 
reflection, a “transformation of energy into thoughtful action” (p. 60); “emotional discharge 
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for expression”  (p. 61). 
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My experience of boards has analogies. At board meetings, when the executives were well 
prepared even if the non-executives were rather less so, decisions passed easily and efficiently; 
executives were content with the outcomes; yet no one felt proud of their work. By contrast, 
board meetings in which challenge took place, during which both executives and non-
executives learned more about the business and its problems, led to a sense of satisfaction, 
even delight, at the experience. Strangely, that sensation arose even in circumstances where 
the decisions were not universally welcomed and did not resolve the problems those boards 
were trying to address. What mattered was that the encounters increased awareness of the 
complexities. 
For example, in a social-care business, where the sources of income – local government 
agencies who are the “customers” – hold all the power, boards have few levers to improve 
performance. But coming to realize that through what Dewey might call their “impulsion” to 
make things better and resistance of challenge concerning alternative approaches creates the 
heightened sensitivity akin to artistic expression. The same sort of experience can come from 
a meeting, say, about a new product idea when the debate stimulates new perceptions, whether 
the decision favors going ahead with a product launch or not. 
The opposite side is captured also by Langevoort (2001), who writes of boards where the 
outside, non-executive directors have been captured by the CEO. They become mere social 
clubs with a rubber stamp to approve the CEO’s decisions. Sonnenfeld, Kusin, and Waltonz 
(2013) found that many chief executives expressed disappointment in outside directors who 
failed to provide the resistance that leads to reflection. Such experience might be described as 
artless, anesthetic corporate governance (Cf. Cohen, 2007).  
Within expression, Dewey (1934/1958, pp. 64-65) notes four characteristics of art: a) its 
creation of an integral experience, in which b) the object comes about through pressure on 
natural impulses, implying c) that construction requires time, not instantaneous emission, and 
d) excitement in production stirs up the store of attitudes and meanings. Let us look at each in 
turn. 
Integral experience 
For Dewey, an integral experience arises from the “interaction of organic and 
environmental conditions and energies” (1934/1958, p. 64). He leaves this depiction rather 
vague, but the argument points to the substance of the artist (“organic”) interacting with the 
surrounding materials and circumstances. It seems to indicate the importance of what one of 
Dewey’s most influential followers terms “contingency” (Rorty, 1989). In the setting of 
boards, the experience of integration comes as we build a picture of the business as a whole 
and how it aligns with the contingencies of the business environment, reacting or failing to 
reaction to changing circumstances. 
In my cases, the publishing businesses both involved creative individuals with a store of 
knowledge and the ability to project it into words and images in print. Both faced the challenge 
of the sudden explosion of the internet, however, which was replacing print publications and 
opening new avenues that had little to do with the skills resident “organically” in the 
companies. Acrimonious board meetings took place at one of them, when management refused 
even to discuss how the business idea might be translated into a different medium. At the other, 
the while the problem was recognized, the skills deficit of the incumbents, and the incumbents 
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voting power, we failed to resolve the issues. Such meetings were unsatisfying in their 
outcomes, but they nonetheless yielded greater appreciation of the issues among all the 
directors.  
Some studies have sought to capture the ethos of the boardroom and its interaction through 
the comments that directors make to consultations about the codification of board practice. 
Spira and Slinn (2013) give an account of the formulation of the Cadbury Code in the UK, 
which cites in part comments from corporate directors about the negative impact the code 
might have on the candor of board discussion. Nordberg (2017) extends that by examining 
how directors sought to preserve a version of board ethos through the drafting of three major 
versions of the UK code over two decades, and their fear of a loss of intensity of interaction.  
In my board work, directors’ time is generally routine, though punctuated by points of 
agony and ecstasy that arise when the debate illuminates aspects of the landscape, either within 
the business or in its environment. For example, a joke that uses as its butt a shibboleth within 
the organization can put pressure on longstanding but questionable beliefs or deinstitutionalize 
a practice.  
Pressure 
The interaction then requires work, the “pressure exercises by objective things upon 
natural impulses and tendencies” (Dewey, 1934/1958, pp. 64-65). Artists use tools to shape 
the raw materials but also to shape the ideas and emotions, the impulses but also the inclination 
to employ pre-existing templates that infer imitation, rather than creation. Translated to the 
less tangible work of boards, this suggests that art-like elevation of sensibilities is unlikely to 
come from routine but instead in tasks related to problem-solving and strategy formation.  
Most research into the work of boards seeks either to link boards to outcomes (reviewed 
in Judge & Talaulicar, 2017) or, in qualitative studies to understand the processes they use 
(McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1998). Nonetheless, these studies and 
others provide glimpses of sources of director satisfaction that can arise, for example, from 
the experience of liminality in  board work (Concannon & Nordberg, 2018) and of the highly 
personal experience of board decision-making recorded by Parker (2007). 
Facing a strategic issue that imperiled one of the charities I served, board meetings were 
still plagued by routine. We dispensed with that quickly, however, and made space in the 
agenda for free and frank discussions of the failures of prior approaches, the lessons to be 
drawn from them, and the generation of options for a way forward from the current 
predicament. That the discussions were free and frank led to pressure for action. That the 
actions did not yield the desired outcome by the deadlines led to further pressure but also 
deeper understanding of the internal weakness that needed to be addressed. Some decisions 
take time. 
Time 
For Dewey, because art is the experience of it, creation takes time. The artist constructs 
the object and reconstructs it through revision and iteration. These are the changes a painter 
makes while making sense of the thing observed and the ideas that come to mind, or the 
revisions a writer makes in crafting a manuscript and finding the right words. Dewey holds 
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that “expression of the self … is itself a prolonged interaction” that acquires a form it did not 
previously have” (1934/1958, p. 65, emphasis in the original). 
In board work, such creation of form is evident in the gathering of disparate perspectives, 
challenge to material presented by the executive, reflected against the outside experiences of 
non-executive directors, followed by the distillation of views into decisions. In the constantly 
shifting sands in businesses as diverse as high-technology industries or social enterprises 
dependent upon powerful state buyers, decisions made once may need continual refinement 
and modification, and thus a continuing need to return to the stock of prior experiences and 
then back to the strategy canvas. 
Exciting the ‘store’ 
For Dewey, when the interaction of the internal and external, the work on compression 
involved in their integration, and the duration of the effort combine on a subject whose matter 
does deep, they can stir up “a store of attitudes and meanings derived from prior experience.” 
He likens this process to fire, which then inspires but also creates commotion and turmoil. It 
makes conscious thoughts, emotions, and images, which either burn out or “press itself out … 
into a refined product” (Dewey, 1934/1958, p. 65). “Unless there is com-pression nothing is 
ex-pressed” (p. 66, punctuation in the original). 
Much of the debate in the board meetings is rather routine, even perfunctory. Decisions 
needs approval for reasons of constitutional formalities or because the spending exceeds 
permitted under guidelines for managerial discretion. But those are not the decisions that 
directors remember, find satisfaction in having achieved, or regret for years to come. Board 
discussion of a proposed acquisition, a line of credit, or a regulatory action with implications 
for revenue, and how each would impact the risk calculus and reserves involves debates that 
stir up meanings for other aspects of the business as well as memories of past decisions that 
have gone well or badly. These views are then synthesized, with parts rejected as less or 
irrelevant, in a word, compressed, pointing us toward the final expression.  
The experience of observers 
Dewey’s account of the nature of observer/audience experience of art is less fully 
articulated. But he draws a clear distinction between being receptive and passive. Receptivity 
is a process involving a “series of responsive acts that accumulate toward objective 
fulfillment” without which “there is not perception but [merely] recognition.” Experiencing a 
work of art is thus an active engagement with it, seeing the uniqueness of it, not the 
stereotypical. “The perceived object or scene is emotionally pervaded throughout” 
(1934/1958, p. 52). “For to perceived, a beholder must create his own experience” (p. 54, 
emphasis in the original). 
In the practice of corporate boards, the role of the audience in art is analogous to the 
presence of observers in board meetings. Academic literature on boards provides scant 
evidence of such events. Far more often, the board is called a “black box” from which 
observers are excluded (Klarner, Probst, & Useem, 2019; Rost & Osterloh, 2010). Researchers 
only occasionally penetrate it, and then to study directors (e.g. Pugliese, Nicholson, & 
Bezemer, 2015), and not themselves.  
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A UK professional body examined what happens in meetings in large healthcare 
organizations when members of the public attend. Agendas and board discussions both 
avoided controversy and strategic debate, focusing instead on the routine (ICSA, 2011). But 
even that study begs the question of whether observation changed the nature of the event. Here 
we must rely on the anecdotal. 
Visitors to the boards on which I have served talk about being there as a privilege, an 
intense experience of the complexity of decision-making and the scope of issues with which 
directors wrestled. These individuals were mainly middle managers unaccustomed to regular 
interactions with non-executive directors or executives acting in their role as directors. A few 
were “trainee directors,” individuals thought to have the potential to serve on the board and 
granted full access to board meetings and papers for a time, but without voting rights or legal 
responsibilities. Even though those enterprises have been relatively simple businesses, with 
far fewer moving parts than a major listed company, nonetheless visitors have felt heightened 
awareness of business issues and gained insights they could not have experienced from 
outside. Visitors express what Dewey’s formulation would call perception, not just 
recognition.  
An initial step toward discussion 
Dewey’s ideas aesthetics have not gone unnoticed in corporate governance (Pye, 2001, 
notes that it helped her frame an electic study of boards). Still, there are at least two reasons 
to be cautious in stretching Dewey conceptualization into a seemingly unrelated field, 
especially with such limited evidence. First, Dewey’s is a formulation of its time and, in 
keeping with the pragmatist philosophy he espoused, it must be historically situated. For 
example, Dewey might exclude much “high art for its lack of emotion, but he relished jazz. 
Second, even an intellectual friend like Shusterman finds Dewey’s aesthetics incomplete. For 
example, Dewey’s distinction between expression and exposure relegating spontaneous 
explosions of emotion to a lesser state leads him to disqualify Van Gogh’s creations as art. 
What would he have made Jackson Pollock? That is, even applied to its own field Dewey’s 
theory begs questions.  
However, this paper does not assert theoretical completeness or claim discovery of a 
perfect analytic fit to the landscape of corporate governance. Nor does it assert that aesthetic 
experiences are frequent in boardrooms; indeed, its evidence even suggests it is not. Nor do 
its accounts allow us even to consider the possibility that an aesthetic view of governance will 
create better outcomes, in terms of better firm performance or reduced risk. Instead, it seeks 
more modestly to excite interest in exploring the experience of directors and corporate boards 
with fresh lenses.  
Research that posits outcomes as the justification of governance activities takes an 
organizational and sometimes societal vantage point as to what is essential. In so doing, it 
turns boards into instruments of corporate performance through recommendations that 
standardize their processes and prescriptions. When policy follows such guidance, it risks 
ignoring the humanist side of corporate governance, the motivation that leads people to engage 
in the effort at all. It risks seeing boards as control mechanisms to tame the rapacious greed of 
executives or channel it toward shareholder benefit, but little else. In asking that we apply an 
aesthetic lens alongside it, this paper questions what it takes to motivate people to engage in 
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monitoring and stewardship and finds the beginnings of an answer in the opportunity for the 
sort of experience Dewey finds in art. This has implications for both the practice of corporate 
governance and for policy. 
Implications for corporate governance practice 
This paper asked the question, why would someone want to be a corporate director? Yes, 
the role comes with some glamor and external esteem, and often with some money. Even 
unpaid directorships can be stepping-stones to something more lucrative. But if the argument 
in this paper is valid, then organization should reflect on what it takes to capture and hold a 
director’s attention. Many of the failings in corporate governance recorded in practitioner 
writing and in press accounts point the finger at directors or regulators who were absent or 
“asleep at the wheel” (Gribben, 2008; see also MacAvoy & Millstein, 2003). Keeping them 
awake requires work that commands their attention, which, if Dewey’s theory of aesthetics 
applies, means providing a vehicle for expression, working through problems over time, 
compressing data into information and information into insights, and doing with while bearing 
the responsibility for decisions made. To be sure, much of board practice will remain routine, 
what in art Dewey calls “anesthetic.” But as the study of UK National Health Service boards 
by ICSA (2011) might have concluded, anesthetic governance can put you to sleep.  
Implications for corporate governance policy 
Policy, too, can present a danger to the aesthetics of corporate governance. The analysis 
of codes above alludes to how focusing on outcomes-based analysis risks creating practices 
that reduce the work of directors to box-ticking (Fenwick & Vermeulen, 2018; Rushton, 2008), 
to mere compliance without reference to meaning-making (Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014), 
and to what Dewey might call a practice that fail to stir up attitudes and meaning from past 
experience. The work might lack the sense of integration that Dewey sees as “experience” 
worthy of the name.  
This argument is not to diminish the importance of analysis in corporate governance, or 
of the need for psychic distance and challenge in the boardroom often associated with board 
effectiveness (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Nordberg & Booth, 2019). Those aspects are often 
precisely what makes the practice of boards into an aesthetic experience for directors. Codes 
of conduct and regulation of practices like audit and corporate reporting can provide 
frameworks that directors see as elegant approaches to messy problems, as ways of seeing the 
whole among the pieces. But atomizing compliance into its constituent elements runs the risk 
of depriving directors of the sense of the integrated whole involved in the sort of decision-
making from which they can derive satisfaction. For Dewey (1934/1958, p. 341), “[t]he 
mechanical stands at the pole opposite to that of the esthetic.”  
Limitations and extensions 
This analysis, drawing on reflection more than evidence, and viewing the experience of 
directors philosophically as aesthetic satisfaction rather than consequentialist instrumentality, 
is both empirically and conceptually narrow. The empirical limitation can be addressed 
through adopting a variety of other methods of studying director motivation. The conceptual 
narrowness might be overcome by examining another question: Does the “ugly” work of 
directors, the battles, the unresolved issues, the bust-ups over policy decisions that lead 
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individual directors to the exit, also have an aesthetic quality? In the practice of the boards I 
have served, such events have certainly brought about heightened sensibilities, visions of the 
whole that seem to be slipping from our grasp. Not all dramas are comedies, after all; and the 
corporate world has experienced a fair few tragedies. Empirically, further research into 
director experiences of boardroom practice might include attempts to look beyond outcomes 
and processes into the psychological and symbolic elements of board work. This paper has 
scratched those surfaces by asking about director motivation and the meaning that physical 
boardrooms might bring to the experience of what takes within them. And it has barely started 
to examine where the “anesthetic” in corporate governance might lie.  
Moreover, these observations may not translate easily to the level of large, listed 
companies, with the resources to supply their boards with deeply researched proposals and 
finely crafted solutions presented to the board for ratification. Non-executive directors in such 
companies have material interests, at least in the form of director fees, and the ability to 
leverage board experience in one company to others. Large corporations can also arrange 
substantial insurance to offset directors’ personal liability. Solutions to large-corporate 
problems might become finely crafted elsewhere in the organization, and not in the boardroom. 
That is, the artistic experience may lie elsewhere in the organization, rather than with the 
board. Might this be a reason for big company boardroom ugliness? 
Furthermore, I make no claim that appreciation of the aesthetic in the work of boards is 
sufficient for good corporate governance, or even necessary. The experience of heightened 
sensitivity, of seeing a whole – contingent and historically situated though it may be – 
resonates with my own board work and those of others with whom I have served. I have heard 
something similar from people I have met, directors of listed companies in several countries, 
whose experience led me to pursue corporate governance as a field of study. Further research 
into the range of director motivations might help us understand better what role that context 
and personality play in situations where aesthetic governance aligns with favorable outcomes, 
and where it might not. 
Reflections on a debate not ready for conclusion 
The artwork we observed at the opening of this paper is emblematic of something for each 
organization. For one it was a sign of the success of the business, a business that saw itself at 
the forefront of its industry, steeped in tradition (oak-paneled walls) but at the same to 
innovative and disruptive (impressionist, expressionist). For the other it was a display of the 
work of the organization for its beneficiaries, which remind us of the of the benefit we deliver 
when we ease some of the grimmer aspects of their lives. They are reminders to those who 
enter the boardrooms of sort of experience they should seek to achieve.  
For Dewey, the “real work of art” isn’t the object created, but rather the work it does for 
the artist and audience, “the building up of an integral experience out of the interaction of 
organic and environmental conditions and energies.” When the “excitement is deep” it stirs 
up meanings from prior experiences, which inform activities that become “conscious thoughts 
and emotions … To be set on fire by a thought or scene is to be inspired” (Dewey, 1934/1958, 
pp. 66, 67). In this Deweyan view, we may wish to consider the work of corporate governance 
not to be the outputs, not the statements in the annual report, and not even the profitability of 
a business decision. It may instead lie in the experience of undertaking challenge and 
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subsequent enlightenment, of constructing and reconstructing, over time, the basis of business 
decisions.  
Using the language of his day, when the masculine included the feminine, Dewey writes 
of management: 
Two men meet: one is the applicant for a position, while the other has the 
disposition of the matter is his hands. The interview may be mechanical, 
consisting of set questions, the replies to which perfunctorily settle the 
matter. … The situation is disposed of as if it were an exercise in 
bookkeeping. But an interplay may take place in which a new experience 
develops. Where should we look for an account of such an experience? Not 
in ledger-entries nor yet to a treatise on economics or sociology or 
personnel psychology, but to drama and fiction. Its nature can only be 
expressed in art, because there is a unity of experience that can be 
expressed only as an experience (Dewey, 1934/1958, p. 43). 
In the study of corporate governance, we pay a lot of attention to ledger entries, economics, 
sociology and psychology. We see – in academic studies and almost daily financial news 
media – evidence of the ugliness in its execution. In its practice, however, we sometimes 
experience its art. Perhaps we should study that, too. 
In this small and tentative set of opinions and comments, the satisfaction participants in 
board meetings feel seems to arise through sensitivity heightened by boardroom debate, the 
experience of connecting many of the pieces of corporate decisions into a vision of the 
corporate whole. A board agenda that looks at the pieces but does not provide the opportunity 
to see the whole seems to present a different experience of being a director. If this argument 
is valid, policy too might benefit from seeking connections so those engaged in board practice 
might have a better chance of finding the art in corporate governance. 
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